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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
I~ICHARD P. Sl\iOOT and 
BARBARA l\L S~rOOT, 
Plaintiffs and Appella;nts, 
-vs.-
HOWARD L. LUND and 
GWEN C. LUND, 
Defenda.n.ts and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9515 
APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiffs-appellants brought this suit consisting 
of four causes of action. \\' e are concerned on this appeal 
\vith a summary judgment granted as to the plaintiffs-
appellants' Second Cause of Action. This cause of action 
''Tas based upon an agreement solicited by the defendant-
respondent, Howard L. Lund, \vhile acting as the attorney 
for the plaintiff-appellant Richard P. Smoot under the 
terms of which appellant Smoot was to lend money to 
Lund to help him buy and develop a real estate project. 
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Appellant Smoot sued to reform the contract alleg-
ing the contract as drafted does not incorporate the total 
agreement between the parties because respondent Lund 
fraudulently drafted it so that it would not express the 
agreement as made between the parties. Appellant Smoot 
also prayed for sums due him under the agreement for 
general damages and for exemph1.ry damages for fraud. 
Lund tendered $15,347.50 into court and moved for Sum-
mary Judgment on this cause of action which motion 'vas 
granted. The appellants Smoot contend that: 
1. The tender of $15,34 7.50 did not entitle the de-
fendants to a summary judgment. 
2. The appellant is entitled to a reformation of the 
contract and that this is an issue ,,-hich cannot be resolved 
on a motion for Summary J ndgment. 
3. The issue of 'vhether or not Smoot is entitled to 
damages and costs cannot be disposed of on a motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ST.A_TE~IF~~T OF F..:\CTS 
The facts alleged in the plaintiffs' ...._.\mended Com-
plaint must be considered as established for purposes of 
this appeal since summary judgment "Tas granted the 
defendants on the allegations contained in the Second 
Cause of Action of the .;\mended Complaint. 
Some time prior to February 9, 1959, the defendants 
solicited financial support from the plaintiffs to finance 
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a real estate YPittur<~ ""hich the defendants "\Vere en-
g'Hg'P< l in. 
1\ t all times pPrtinent to this transaction the defend-
ant, Ho,vard I.J. Lund, \\"as the attorney for the plaintiff-
appellant Riehard P. Smoot. Smoot loaned $36,000.00 
to finance tlH1 real estate venture. Smoot agreed to 
accept one of the lots as an $8,500.00 payment on the loan 
and H<n\·ard Lund agreed to secure the balance of 
$27,500.00 'vith a lien on certain real property owned by 
the defendants and located at 2337 East 13th South, Salt 
Ijake City, Utah, and by a trust deed to a lot in Santa 
Clara County, California. 
Lund further agreed that the remaining real estate 
would be developed and sold and that in the event the 
sales price for this property was in excess of $12,500.00 
the excess would be divided between Smoot and Lund. 
Thereafter on February 9, 1959, Lund prepared 
a document designated as Exhibit '' B '' in the Complaint 
( R-7) and executed a deed of trust to the California prop-
erty, a copy of which was designated as Exhibit '' C '' in 
the Complaint. (R-9, 10) 
The defendant Howard L. Lund represented to his 
client Smoot that the document Exhibit '' B '' was legally 
sufficient to give effect to all the terms of their under-
standing and \\"as sufficient to secure the obligation of 
$27,500.00 and the interest he was to receive in the real 
estate development. 
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The defendant Lund drafted the document (R-7) in 
such a way that it neither protected the plaintiffs with a 
recordable lien on the real estate nor did it spell out the 
agreement that plaintiffs were to share the profits from 
the sale of the remaining real estate if sold for more than 
$12,500.00. 
The appellant further alleges that Lund drew the 
Promissory Note intentionally excluding therefrom the 
usual provisions allowing the costs of collection and at-
torney fees to the holders of the note in the event suit had 
to be brought to collect said note in order to protect him-
self at the expense of his client and that the appellant is 
thereby damaged to the extent of his costs of court and 
attorneys' fees. 
The appellant further alleges that the defendant, 
Ho,Yard L. Lund, executed in plaintiffs' favor a trust 
deed to a lot in Santa Clara County, California, to secure 
the $27,500.00 note and advised the plaintiff not to record 
it and by reason of the trust and confidence that Smoot 
had in Lund the Smoots did not do so. Thereafter the 
defendant, Howard L. Lund, conYeyed the California 
property to a third party in Yiolation of the trust deed 
given to the Smoots to secure their loan. 
Upon learning of this the Smoots filed suit asking the 
following relief: 
1. That the court reform the contract to conform to 
the actual agreement bet,Yccn the parties and enforce 
plaintiffs' rights therein. 
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~- For a judgment for the balance due under the 
promissory note dPsignated as Exhibit '' B '' in the 
Complaint. 
3. That the plaintiffs obtain their attorney fees and 
costs of collection by reason of the act of Lund in pre-
paring the note \vithout the usual cost of collection and 
attorney fee elause being included therein. 
4. That Lund be ordered to obtain a re-conveyance 
of the property in California which was deeded to the 
Smoots as security for the loan and conveyed away in 
fraud on the Smoots. 
5. For exemplary damages. 
6. For costs of court. 
The defendants, almost three months after the action 
was filed, tendered the sum of $15,34 7.50 into court after 
denying any sum at all was due (R-38) and moved for 
Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action which 
was granted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE TENDER INTO COURT OF ANY SUM BY 
THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT JUSTIFY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
PoiNT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFFS 
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WERE NOT ENTITLED TO THE OTHER RE-
LIEF REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
(A) THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED 
TO REFORMATION IF THEY CAN PROVE 
THE FACTS ALLEGED. 
(B) IF THE PLAINTIFFS PROVE THEIR 
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HOWARD L. LUND INTENTIONALLY EX-
CLUDED FROM THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
PROVISIONS NORMALLY INCLUDED BY 
LA WYERS TO ALLOW THEIR CLIENTS TO 
RECOVER COSTS OF COLLECTION AND 
ATTORNEY FEES, THE DEFENDANT 
WOULD BE LIABLE FOR SUCH COSTS AND 
FEES. 
(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS COULD 
NOT RECOVER EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
ARGU~IEXT 
l?oiXT I 
THE TENDER INTO COURT OF ANY SUM BY 
THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT JUSTIFY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
There is no rule of procedure in this state that per-
mits the defendant in an action to tender into court the 
sum he thinks due and then obtain a judgment against 
the plain tiff. 
The rules do provide for an offer of judgment 'vhich 
if accepted results in a judgment against the defendant 
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and if not accepted deprives the plaintiff of interest and 
eo~ts in the event he recovers no more than the amount 
of the offer of judgement. 
"RULE 68 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
(a) TENDER OF MoNEY BEFORE SurT. When in 
an action for the recovery of money only, the de-
fendant alleges in his answer that before the com-
mencement of the action he tendered to the 
plaintiff the full amount to which the plaintiff was 
entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the 
plaintiff the amount so tendered, and the allega-
tion is found to be true, the plaintiff cannot re-
cover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant. 
(b) OFFER BEFORE TRIAL. At any time more 
than 10 days before the trial begins, a party de-
fending against a claim may serve upon the ad-
verse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken 
against him for the money or property or to the 
effect specified in his offer, with costs then ac-
crued. If \vithin 10 days after the service of the 
offer the adverse party serves written notice that 
the offer is accepted, either party may then file 
the offer and notice of acceptance together \vith 
proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment 
shall be entered. An offer not accepted shall be 
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not ad-
missible except in a proceeding to determine costs. 
If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is 
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must 
pay the costs incurred after the making of the 
offer. The fact that an offer is made but not 
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer." 
There is nothing in the record to show that the ten-
der made \vas more than an offer of settlement which the 
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trial court required the plaintiffs to accept by ordering 
that the tender be received and the cause of action be 
dismissed. The defendants did not comply with the rule 
cited above and had they done so they would not be en-
titled to a. summary judgment but could thereby avoid 
interest and costs if the offer of judgment was refused 
and the plaintiffs failed to recover more than the offer of 
judgment. 
PoiNT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO THE OTHER RE-
LIEF REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
(A) THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED 
TO REFORMATION IF THEY CAN PROVE 
THE FACTS ALLEGED. 
The defendant, Howard L. Lund, was the attorney 
for the plaintiffs and drew the strange document in issue, 
(R-7). The plaintiffs allege that he misrepresented the 
legal effect of the document assuring them that the legal 
result of the document was that the Smoots would re-
ceive as consideration for financing the project one-half 
of all profits on the sale of the remaining portion of the 
real estate over $12,500.00. 
A misrepresentation of la"~ by an attorney to his 
client or eYcn to a lay person not his client is a fraud. 
ResfafeJne11f of Torts, Sec. 621 Comment (d). Goodrich 
v. ~-.'iears, 270 Fed. 971; F)tatcn Island Ice Co. r. [T. S. 85 
Fed. (~d) 68; Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 Ill. 208, 153 
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~.E. 827 ~ ~~~nterson ( 1o. v . .. Anderson, 58 ~[ont. 617, 194 
Pa(l. 160~ ~l'"hitc v. Heui(·au, 77 Okl. 123, 186 Pac. 224, 9 
.\. L. B. 1041 ~ (1\nnotations on this point 96 1\. L. R. 992); 
Resfatcntcut of Contracts, Sec. 474, Comment (d); Crau-
nu'r v. Kausa.s (:ity Higluray Co., 112 Kan. 298, 211 
Pac. 118. 
The above authorities hold it a fraud even though no 
attorney-client relationship existed. This should be true 
a fortiori 'vhere the advice and interpretation is given by 
the plaintiffs' own attorney who drafted the contract and 
who is personally interested in it. 
If the plaintiffs prove that their attorney falsely 
represented that the document prepared by him spelled 
out in legal verbage the understanding of the parties, 
they are entitled to have the agreement reformed by the 
court to conform to the true agreement between the 
parties. 
"Still another remedy is applicable for a par-
ticular kind of fraud. This remedy is reformation 
of a writing which owing to the fraud of one of 
the parties and mistake of the other fails to ex-
press the agreement at which they arrived.'' ( W il-
liston on Contracts No. 1525 Page 4272) 
If the contract was to be reformed as prayed, 
the plaintiffs \vould be entitled to a share of the profits in 
the real estate venture and not just a return of their 
money loaned to the Lunds. The right to reformation of 
this contract for fraud cannot be disposed of on a motion 
for summary judgment, the issue of fraud being an issue 
of fact. Indeed, the burden of proof is usually imposed 
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upon the attorney dealing with his clients to show the 
complete fairness of the transaction and that he protected 
his client in every way possible. York v. James, 26 Wyo. 
184, 165 Pac. (2d) 109. 
(B) IF THE PLAINTIFFS PROVE THEIR 
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HOWARD L. LUND INTENTIONALLY EX-
CLUDED FROM THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
PROVISIONS NORMALLY INCLUDED BY 
LA WYERS TO ALLOW THEIR CLIENTS TO 
RECOVER COSTS OF COLLECTION AND 
ATTORNEY FEES, THE DEFENDANT 
WOULD BE LIABLE FOR SUCH COSTS AND 
FEES. 
It is hard to believe that any attorney, if employed 
to draw a promissory note for $27,500.00, would draw it 
so that if the maker did not pay the note "Then due his 
client could not recover his costs of collection including 
reasonable attorney fees. 
The plaintiffs allege that the attorney intentionally 
excluded these provisions in order to protect himself in 
the event of default. If these allegations are proved, the 
client \Yonld surel~T be entitled to damages for his inten-
tionally excluding these provisions. 
An attorney occupies a position of trust and confi-
dence with referenc0 to his rlient 's affairs and in deal-
ing- with his client he must exercise the highest degree of 
rare; the utmost good faith, honesty, integrity, fairness, 
and fidelity. 7 C.J.S. Sec. 125, Page 957. 
10 
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If the note in issue had been drawn with a third party 
as maker instead of the payees' own attorney it is ex-
tremely doubtful that such a document would meet the 
standard of practice required of attorneys in this state 
and, if it did not, the defendant Lund would be guilty of 
negligent practice and would be liable to his client. A 
fortiori he is liable if he intentionally excludes these pro-
visions in a note where he is the maker and his client is 
the payee. 
This issue was ruled upon as a matter of law, the 
trial court holding in effect by its ruling that an attor-
ney owes no duty in dealing with his client to incorporate 
the usual and reasonable provisions in a promissory note 
to protect his client. This is certainly an issue of fact 
\\·hich cannot be decided against the plaintiffs as a matter 
of law. 
(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS COULD 
NOT RECOVER EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants defrauded 
them in the following particulars : 
1. By advising them that recording the trust deed 
\Yas unnecessary and then selling the very property con-
Yeyed to them by the trust deed. 
2. By falsely advising the plaintiffs as to the legal 
effect of the ''Promissory Note.'' 
11 
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3. By so drafting the agreement that it deprived the 
plaintiffs of substantial rights in order for Lund to profit 
thereby and have the advantage of his client. 
If these allegations are sustained by the evidence 
the plaintiffs could be awarded exemplary damages. Ex-
emplary damages may be allowed against an attorney 
who, when dealing with his client, violates his duty. The 
cases do not even require a showing of actual damage so 
strict is the law as it relates to the duty owed by an attor-
ney to his client. 7 C.J.S. No. 157 at Page 1004; Hill v. 
Montgomery, 56 N.E. 320; Greenberg v. Billelo, 7 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 735; Harmening v. Howland, 141 N.W.131. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in granting Summary Judgment on 
plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action. There are substantial 
issues of fact to be tried and the offer to pay a sum 
deemed by the defendants to be a sufficient sum to settle 
the case does not entitle them to Summary Judgmnt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HYDE 
-l-01 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
315 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
12 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and ... 4ppellants 
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